This is Senior Editor Will Kaback, welcoming you back from the weekend. The past 48 hours have brought an array of major news stories, setting us up for what looks to be a consequential week here in the U.S. and abroad. 

We’re starting off with some major developments in the Middle East — specifically, the escalating Houthi attacks that threaten to open a new front in the Iran war. We’ve also got a reader question about felons’ voting rights and an inspiring story of a mission to honor the victims of 9/11.

It’s a 14-minute read.

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The DSA debate.

On Friday, Ross Barkan authored a guest column making the case for the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). The piece has generated over 500 comments and a robust debate over Barkan’s arguments and the DSA’s merit. Check out the piece and join the conversation here.

Quick hits.

1. President Donald Trump announced that he is barring CNN, MS NOW and Politico journalists from the White House, claiming that their reporting about his administration has been inaccurate. The outlets announced they will sue to challenge the ban. (The ban) On Monday, Fox News Media, ABC News, CBS News, NBC News, and CNN issued a joint statement saying they will not provide pool coverage of the White House in protest of the ban. (The statement)
2. President Trump announced a security agreement with Greenland and Denmark that he said gives the United States “permanent control over security, and all other needs, in Greenland” and bars any U.S. adversary from establishing a base on the island without U.S. approval. (The announcement)
3. Ukraine launched a large-scale drone attack on Moscow on the final day of Russia’s parliamentary election. Russian officials said the strikes killed at least four people. (The strikes)
4. President Trump posted on Truth Social that his planned “Triumphal Arch” in Washington, D.C. will also serve as a military complex housing drones and sniper positions. (The update) 
5. A Venezuelan national was shot during an encounter with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers in Austin, Texas, and he is currently hospitalized in stable condition. ICE said the man has a final order of removal and that he attempted to flee when stopped by officers. (The shooting)

Today’s topic.

Escalations in the Middle East. As the war in Iran nears its seventh month, new developments over the past week have prompted concerns about a widening conflict in the Middle East. On Saturday, the State Department warned Americans in the Middle East to “exercise heightened vigilance” and prepare for potential travel disruptions, and President Donald Trump returned from a weekend trip to Camp David a day early. Separately, Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen have launched significant attacks against Saudi Arabia and seized key Red Sea territory. 

Back up: The current Houthi–Saudi Arabia conflict dates to the start of the Yemeni civil war in 2014. Saudi Arabia backs Yemen’s internationally recognized Sunni Muslim government, while the Shiite Muslim Houthi rebels have sought to overthrow that government. A 2022 ceasefire de-escalated the fighting, but Houthi attacks against ships in the Red Sea throughout the war in Gaza have reignited hostilities.

On Tuesday, September 8, the Houthis launched an offensive, capturing Yemeni territory on and around the Red Sea, including the port city of Mokha and Perim Island, threatening to disrupt transportation through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Red Sea’s importance for shipping has increased amid the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, making the attacks potentially disruptive for the global economy. 

The rebel group has also directly attacked Saudi Arabia. On Saturday, the kingdom confirmed that the Houthis fired a ballistic missile at the capital, Riyadh, and targeted civilian infrastructure in the port city of Yanbu. The Saudis also accused the Houthis of attempting to attack the holy city of Mecca, which they called a “red line”; the Houthis deny the accusations. 

President Trump is reportedly weighing heightened attacks against Iran. On Sunday, Fox News’s Trey Yingst said that the president told him “very big things are going to be happening in the not-so-distant future,” and, “My question is, if and when do I blow the entire nation up?” Later on Sunday, Trump reportedly decided that the United States will not enter the Saudi–Houthi conflict at this time.

Separately, new reports have shed light on the Iran war’s potential cost to the United States. On Tuesday, CBS News published photos that appear to show significant damage to U.S. military bases and assets across the Middle East, including destroyed aircraft, vehicles, and buildings. On Friday, The Washington Post reported that the Pentagon is aware of at least 22 U.S. military fatalities linked to the Iran war, four more than the Defense Department has publicly acknowledged. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth strongly denied that any deaths are being covered up. 

Today, we’ll share views from the left, right, and writers in the Middle East about the latest in the region. Then, Senior Editor Will Kaback gives his take.

In Bloomberg, Marc Champion wrote “Trump’s ‘little war’ with Iran just got a lot bigger.”

“It is an unintended feature of President Donald Trump’s Plan B for defeating Iran — economic strangulation — that the more successful the policy becomes, the more risk the men who run the Islamic Republic are willing to accept to fight it,” Champion said. “It’s clear that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is capable of escalating the conflict in ways it previously avoided… [One] gun that long sat over the conflict’s Chekhovian fireplace was the potential for Tehran to get its Houthi allies in Yemen to block the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.”

“[The Houthis] have now taken that gun off the wall… [The group’s] territorial gains, if consolidated, could prove enough to give the Houthis the kind of permanent control over the strait that the Iranians are now demanding over Hormuz,” Champion wrote. “These developments were unimaginable before the US and Israel went to war against Iran in search of regime change. But, as Gregory Johnsen, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, said in a web briefing last week, Iran’s example in Hormuz has given the Houthis a new direction in their efforts to secure revenue and leverage.”

The Philadelphia Inquirer editorial board said “President Trump’s new strategy on the Iran war [is] pretending there isn’t one.”

“The war has had tremendous repercussions for U.S. service members and civilians in the Middle East, American security and credibility, and global trade and stability. The only aspect of the conflict that is not serious is Trump’s handling of it,” the board wrote. “Despite the administration’s best efforts to obfuscate the human cost of the conflict, the war has killed 18 American service members and wounded nearly 800, taken thousands of lives in Iran and the Middle East, injured tens of thousands across the region, and displaced hundreds of thousands. And the fighting has likely cost American taxpayers more than $100 billion in direct spending.”

“The war has also depleted the military’s supplies of critical munitions, leaving us more vulnerable to adversaries, and strained our forces with marathon deployments and logistical disruptions,” the board said. “The trouble is that Trump and his lieutenants don’t appear to have a strategy for waging war on — or making peace with — Iran. What they have instead is a plan to manage the public relations fallout of the conflict by lying about its casualties, costs, and extent in the hope voters won’t punish their party for it in the midterm elections.”

In The New York Post, Bridget Toomey argued “Houthi attacks expose Iran’s desperation.”

“Tehran saw its leverage slipping away — and expanded the battlefield to attack the United States and its allies from a different angle. That’s the takeaway from this week’s fighting in Yemen,” Toomey wrote. “Without revenue from its oil sales, an Iranian financial crisis is imminent — so the regime, through its terror proxies, seeks to open a new front in the energy war. So far it has succeeded… By holding the territory along the Red Sea’s narrow entrance and the island inside it, the Houthis can effectively control transits through the key waterway.”

“The United States must commit to supporting Saudi Arabia in driving the Houthis back from their strategic positions on the Red Sea coast. The Treasury Department can target the Houthis’ financial lifelines by sanctioning exchange houses, financial institutions and front companies — particularly in Oman,” Toomey said. “And Washington needs to seriously consider increasing its operational support of Riyadh, including potential US airstrikes, in the effort to free southern Yemen from this terrorist group. It makes little sense to continue striking Iran while granting immunity to one of its key proxies.”

The Wall Street Journal editorial board wrote about “the Saudis, the Houthis, and Israel.”

“Is the Houthi crisis a diplomatic opportunity? Saudi Arabia has come running to Washington and even to Israel in its hour of need. Meanwhile, Riyadh’s feud with the United Arab Emirates continues to backfire,” the board said. “With all of these moving pieces, there may be a checkmate for Mr. Trump to find… The Houthi blockade on Saudi oil has already become the impetus for the kind of Saudi-Israeli-Emirati cooperation that only U.S. Central Command can convene. That’s the regional alliance needed to counter Iran and its Houthi proxy militia.”

“[Congress can] persuade the President to use the nuclear deal as a bargaining chip. The Saudis have been making a lot of requests after they denied the U.S. use of its airspace at a crucial moment, derailing Operation Freedom to guide ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Let the Saudis give up the deal’s domestic-enrichment plank,” the board wrote. “Or Riyadh can join the Abraham Accords, as Mr. Trump says, and cement the U.S. regional alliance.”

In Al Jazeera, Suleiman Al-Aqili asked “has Trump abandoned Bab al-Mandeb to the Houthis?”

“What is happening at Bab al-Mandeb is not an isolated event, but the latest in a long series of US retreats from security commitments that for decades underpinned the ‘security-for-oil’ relationship between Washington and the Gulf states,” Al-Aqili said. “This is not a passing political position, but a profound shift in the regional security landscape: the United States is choosing not to intervene militarily against an armed group designated as terrorist that controls one of the world’s most important straits and whose actions go beyond the logic of conventional deterrence.”

“Since the 1970s, the US–Gulf relationship has rested on a clear but implicit bargain: the United States provides a security umbrella protecting the Gulf states and energy routes, while the Gulf states ensure a steady flow of oil to the global economy at reasonable prices… Today, there are mounting signs that this formula is beginning to collapse,” Al-Aqili wrote. “Trump’s refusal to defend Bab al-Mandeb, and his response to the Houthis’ request that the US stay out of the conflict in return for allowing American ships to pass — effectively a political deal — marks a watershed. For the first time, the United States is clearly hesitating to defend energy security and a pivotal ally against a direct threat to global energy infrastructure.”

In Middle East Monitor, Mansoor Qaisar said “the Mecca Pact must meet the test of war.”

“With fighting escalating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia under attack, regional leaders no longer have the luxury of discussing security institutions as a future project. They must show what those institutions can do now,” Qaisar wrote. “What distinct assistance and diplomatic leadership can the pact provide? Pakistan said on September 10 that no military response under the agreement had been discussed. The gap between a collective promise and an operational response deserves scrutiny.”

“The pact should begin with tasks whose public value is clear: protecting civilians, coordinating air defence, sharing intelligence and securing commercial navigation. Its members should agree how an attack is assessed, how assistance is requested and how collective decisions are made. A promise to stand together becomes credible when governments know what they have promised and citizens understand the limits of the commitment,” Qaisar said. “Continued attacks require a response with clear limits and political purpose.”

My take. Will Kaback Senior Editor

It’s hard to fully grasp the state of play in Iran amid the changes on the ground and with the president’s focus. I think we’re at a critical juncture right now, and one possible path is Iran getting weaker and reaching a favorable deal with the U.S. The other path is darker and likelier: Iran and the Houthis continue to delay until the U.S. accepts an unfavorable deal.

Reminder: This is where we share a personal opinion. If you have feedback, criticism or compliments, leave a comment or reply to this email.

Although we’ve closely covered the conflict in Iran for months now, I don’t have a strong handle on the trajectory of the war. Instead, I feel a sense of uncertainty and unease.

Reports from the past week have heightened that sense. Recently released photos of damage to U.S. bases suggest Iran’s missile and drone attacks have been more successful than the Trump administration has communicated, adding credence to concerns about the military’s defensive capabilities. At home, energy prices jumped in August (with gas up 3.9% from July), and the Federal Reserve raised interest rates for the first time since 2023. Oh, and we may have barely avoided a direct conflict with China after an AI chatbot mistakenly reported that a Chinese ship in the Middle East was transporting nuclear weapon components. 

While the Trump administration says it remains focused on the Iran war, the president’s attention of late doesn’t seem to extend beyond Washington, D.C., where he’s waging more personal battles against the press and the Kennedy Center. Trump’s handling of the war over the past months reminds me of the scene in Succession where Roman Roy watches a livestream of a rocket launch he coordinated going catastrophically wrong, then gingerly slips his phone back into his pocket and returns to his party, knowing the mess he created is someone else’s to clean up.

With that said, as the fighting approaches the seven-month mark and Houthi attacks threaten to further destabilize the Middle East, I think we’ve reached something resembling a fork in the road. 

Path one is the easier of the two to discern and aligns more with my own view of the conflict. It starts with interpreting the war as a poorly planned mistake, and it leads to a widening conflict that’s rapidly spinning out of control.

Under that interpretation, the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and land seizures in and along the Red Sea are large steps toward a regional war. With traffic through the Strait of Hormuz still restricted, the already important Bab el-Mandeb Strait has become a critical route. The Houthis have now captured key territory in the waterway, threatening to further disrupt energy markets and, consequently, the global economy (adding to the energy woes: Iran-backed militants in Iraq were apparently behind last week’s strikes on Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline, knocking it out of service for weeks). 

The Houthis’ direct attacks on Saudi Arabia could prove equally consequential. From afar, the kingdom appears unprepared for this escalation, with reports that it is already running low on missile interceptors and has called on allies to come to its defense. But experts have long warned about the Houthis opening another front in the war. In an essay published exactly one month ago, political scientist Alexandra Stark wrote, “While the United States looks to wind down the war with Iran, the Houthis are threatening to resume their war in Yemen, which would likely draw in Saudi Arabia, menace the global oil trade and keep the region unstable.” Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan recently signed a mutual-defense agreement — the Mecca Pact — in the model of NATO: If one is attacked, the others come to their aid. 

Just over one month later, the pact is already being tested. Videos from this weekend showed a large column of smoke rising from the Riyadh airport, with additional reports of missiles being shot down over the Saudi capital. Saudi officials even said that the Houthis attempted to attack Mecca, Islam’s holiest city (though the rebel group denied it). Iran is a key backer of the Houthis, and these attacks almost certainly come with the regime’s tacit or explicit support. And they appear to be on their way to turning Saudi Arabia into a new front in the Iran war — if it isn’t already.

The next question is whether other countries get involved. The Mecca Pact is top of mind, with Pakistan’s defense minister signaling last week that the country is prepared to enter the fray (don’t forget, Pakistan has nuclear weapons). How many more dominoes could fall from there? It’s not hard to imagine Israel taking an active role in a widening front, but if major disruptions to energy markets continue, European nations might also decide they have to join the fight.

The Iranian regime’s playbook is straightforward: Withstand the U.S. attacks and sanctions, gum up the Strait of Hormuz, and make the war as broad and unappetizing as possible. It’s succeeding, and with less than two months until the midterms, Republicans appear poised to pay an electoral price. But even in a “blue wave” election that shifts control of one or both chambers of Congress to Democrats — who then rein in the president’s war powers — the conflict could already be beyond U.S. control. Path one’s best-case destination is a U.S. withdrawal under heavily favorable terms for the Iranian regime. 

The road towards that dark outcome is easy to see. But path two, though somewhat shrouded by overgrowth, is still visible. At the start of the war, I expected the combined force of the U.S. military and economic sanctions would overwhelm Iran, but it’s proven resilient (in large part due to the regime’s willingness to allow its people to suffer). Now, about seven months in, that resilience has created the opposite impression: that Iran can withstand U.S. pressure in perpetuity. I’m not sure that’s true.

The cracks are widening in Iran’s economy. Worsening economic conditions preceded the outbreak of nationwide protests in late 2025 and early 2026, and by most metrics, the situation is worse now. The Iranian rial has now lost 63% of its value against the U.S. dollar since March, and the country’s unemployment, inflation, and energy supply are all at crisis levels. Iran’s leaders no doubt want to project the country’s willingness to persevere, but at a certain point, the economic reality will become unavoidable. As Bridget Toomey suggested (under “What the right is saying”), Iran playing its “Houthi card” may signal its desperation.  

As for the Houthis, their Red Sea seizures and Saudi strikes could prove to be a side note in the story of the Iran war. The group showed it was capable of causing headaches in the region with its post-October 7 strikes in the Red Sea, but those attacks ultimately didn’t cause the Gaza war to permanently expand in scope. The same could be true here. Their current offensive may indicate the war’s high-water mark, even if Saudi Arabia’s allies join the effort. 

If the Houthi offensive is contained, where would that leave Iran? Still battered, still economically ravaged, and with limited options for further escalation. If we take path two, I still don’t think a war-ending deal would materialize before the midterms, but it would mean the Trump administration has leverage towards obtaining favorable terms in any eventual agreement. 

Right now, I think we’re more likely headed down path one, but that’s not guaranteed. The days ahead will be instructive — how does Saudi Arabia respond to the Houthi advances? Do its allies get involved? Does the U.S.? Does Iran’s economic collapse accelerate? Do the rising tensions bring both sides back to the negotiating table? Again, the only thing I feel confident in saying is that we’ve reached a critical juncture.

Staff concurrence. Ari Weitzman Managing Editor

I think Will’s right to point out Iran’s weaknesses in the current conflict, especially since most of the awareness we have about the war comes with price increases and body counts. But what if there’s another path? What if Iran and its proxy groups are weak, but they’re still successful at pushing any deal to end the war to the other side of the midterms?   To drop the subjunctive mood, I think that short-term outcome is likely. The part I have trouble seeing is what happens next, which depends heavily on the mood of President Trump in November. If you were to force me to guess, I’d say Republicans underperform in the midterms and that Trump unleashes his frustration with a heavy, heavy escalation in Iran (before a new Congress is sworn in that can vote to limit his war powers).   Whatever ends up happening in November, I agree with Will about the outlook for October: The U.S. and Iran are not on a path that imminently leads to the negotiating table.

Take the survey: How long do you think the war will last? Let us know.

Disagree? That’s okay. Our opinion is just one of many. Write in and let us know why, and we’ll consider publishing your feedback.

Your questions, answered.

Convicted felons aren’t allowed to vote. Since Trump is a convicted felon, doesn’t that apply to him as well? 

— Geri from Alexandria, MN

Associate Editor Carina Pacheco: Voting rights for convicted felons vary by state. Some states restore voting rights upon a person’s release from prison, others after a probation period or parole, others through separate application processes, and still others allow prisoners to vote while incarcerated. Missouri permanently strips voting rights for certain felony offenses, and only one state, Virginia, permanently prohibits all convicted felons from voting (but that appears to be changing).  

As you allude to, then-candidate Donald Trump was convicted on 34 Class E felony counts (the least serious felony classification) in New York in May 2024 for falsifying business records for payments to adult film star Stormy Daniels (widely known as the “hush money” case). In January 2025, just before Trump reassumed office, the case’s presiding judge Juan Merchan ordered an “unconditional discharge,” meaning Trump’s conviction remained, but he would not face any jail time, fines, or probation. Merchan believed that imposing a harsher sentence would improperly interfere with Trump’s duties as President. 

Trump is registered to vote in Florida, where he lists his primary residence. Florida used to bar felons from voting, but in 2018, Floridians approved a referendum to automatically restore voting rights to most felons (excluding those convicted of felony sex offenses and most types of murder) after they’ve served their full sentence, which includes jail time, parole, probation, and any fines or financial penalties. 

Under the state’s stipulations, Trump can vote in Florida. But since Trump was convicted in New York, Florida defers to New York’s rules. 

In New York, felons are only barred from voting while they’re incarcerated. A person convicted of a federal crime in New York regains their voting rights following release. So under both sets of laws, Trump (or anyone else who received an “unconditional discharge” sentence) would never have his vote taken away.

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Numbers.

• 30%. The approximate percentage of global container traffic transported through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait before the start of the Iran war.
• 7%. The percentage of global oil output transported through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in June, according to Kpler. 
• 6.2 million. The estimated number of barrels of crude oil, condensate and refined petroleum products transported through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward Europe, the United States and Asia per day in 2018, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
• 4. The average number of vessels that transited the strait daily between September 14 and September 20, according to TankerMap.
• +383%, +294%, +177%, and +148%. The percent change in the price of vegetable oil, eggs, chicken and red meat, respectively, in Iran over the past year.

The extras.

• One year ago today we had just published a reader mailbag responding to feedback about our coverage of Charlie Kirk’s assassination.
• The most clicked link in our last regular newsletter was our sponsored message from The Penny Hoarder with tips for frugal spending habits.
• Nothing to do with politics: Readers of yesterday’s Sunday newsletter were challenged to beat Managing Editor Ari Weitzman’s score in Krillion, which we shared in The Extras last week. Ari got a 390 on today’s game; give it a try and post your score in the comments of this edition.
• Our last survey: 2,053 readers responded to our survey on the EPA repealing emissions regulations for existing coal-fired and new gas-fired power plants, with 69% saying the repeal is not legally justified and will have a net-negative effect. “This is another anti-science move by the Trump administration,” one respondent said. “Probably a positive short term economic effect and a long term neutral effect as we’re already transitioning away from coal,” said another.

Have a nice day.

After losing his brother Glenn in the attacks of September 11, 2001, Jay Winuk and his longtime friend David Paine decided to create a nonprofit organization called 9/11 Day to reclaim the day and generate hope and community out of the loss. In observance of the 25th anniversary, 9/11 Day collaborated with One Tree Planted and AmeriCorps to pledge to plant 3,000 trees over the next year to honor the victims. On September 9, the organizations launched their plan by planting a tree in Battery Park in Lower Manhattan. Spectrum News New York has the story.